nasia for the elderly and a Michigan doctor to create and use the so-called 'death machine' (1) . Jewish law vigorously asserts that life, even that of a terminal, demented, elderly patient is of infinite value; it must be preserved no less than the life of a young and alert child with a hopeful long-term prognosis (2) .
This bold position is presented in a classic case (Yoma 83a) where the Mishnah directs that one must immediately remove debris that has fallen upon someone on Shabbat, even though the victim may only live for a short time. Jewish legal codes and responsa (3) elaborate that he or she must be saved even though his or her skull was crushed and he or she may live for only a few minutes. Though he may have been moribund, mentally incompetent, or a minor ... his life must be saved (4) . This ruling is based on Judaism's attributing infinite value to human life. 'Infinity being indivisible, any fraction of life, however limited its expectancy or its health, remains equally infinite in value' (5) . A more dramatic illustration of this principle is that of a triage decision in a facility which has only one respirator. The machine is connected to a deathly ill, disoriented 90-year-old. May this patient be removed from the respirator in favour of a young accident victim who has just arrived, who will surely die without it, but will probably recover with it? Here, too, halachic authorities rule that the dying elderly patient already on the machine may not be removed from the respirator (4) . By removing the old man from the respirator in favour of the young one, we would be, in effect, declaring that the old man's life is less valuable than that of the young one. De facto, we play God when we pass judgement on the 'quality of life'. However, in such cases where neither of them has been placed on the respirator, priority is, of course, given to the young accident victim who has the better prognosis for long-term recovery (6).
Every life-saving measure -even extraordinary ones -must be utilized to prolong life, with few exceptions -the most common being severe, unremitting pain and suffering. The source of this concept is found in the Talmud, (Ketubot 1 04a) which describes the fatal illness of the great Rabbi Judah the Prince, known simply as 'Rebbe'. Rebbe's pious maidservant, upon seeing her master's suffering, prayed for his demise, and even interrupted his students from praying for his life. Since the Talmud does not criticize her conduct, Rabbenu Nissim, a major Talmudic commentator, concludes: ' There are times when one should pray for the sick to die, such as when one is suffering greatly from his malady and his condition is terminal ...' (7). Contemporary authorities have applied this passage to the treatment of the critically ill in extreme pain, by allowing them to refuse 'extraordinary' life-saving measures, and to receive intensive doses of pain-killers (2) .
God entrusts us with our bodies which we must keep safe and healthy. He grants us the legal status of a bailee (8), who must make every effort to guard the article he is given, protecting it from loss and damage. Interestingly, this concept of guardianship is expressed clearly in the words of the Torah -'Only guard yourself, surely guard your soul ...' (Deut 4:9), which Maimonides (9) and others say refers to protecting one's health. Another The chaplain is often called upon to recommend policy in another critical area: What should the facility's position be towards a patient who refuses to be 'fed' through a nasogastric tube or through a gastrostomy? Medically, both of these procedures are similar in that food and hydration are introduced into the patient's functioning gastrointestinal tract when he is unable to swallow or eat normally. The nasogastric tube is inserted into a patient's nostril and is guided through the oesophagus into the stomach. Though this is a relatively simple procedure, it can lead to serious side-effects, such as pneumonia, aspiration, and diarrhoea (14, 15). Moreover, it is not uncommon for patients who are irritated by larger tubes to pull them out (16) . The more permanent procedure is a gastrostomy, where the feeding tube is surgically implanted directly through the abdominal wall into the stomach, which also presents some risk for seriously ill patients (14 (20) .
Some researchers declare that CPR is 'rarely effective for elderly patients' and that they and their families 'have a right to know the truth about the poor outcomes of cardiopulmonary resuscitation' (21) . Others favour a more radical proposal: not to offer CPR to nursing home residents. Though they concede that this across-the-board policy 'might be unfair to the small number of residents who have a reasonable chance of survival ... it would protect the many residents who now undergo CPR without having genuinely consented' (22) .
There are significant studies and clinical reports that differ markedly from the above and assert that 'elderly patients can benefit from attempted resuscitation from out-of-hospital cardiac arrest'. They cite earlier studies which show that between two per cent (in rural areas) and nine per cent (in urban centres) of patients aged 70 or older survive to hospital discharge after out-of-hospital cardiopulmonary arrest; their own research findings also confirm that 'rapid and efficient resuscitation from out-of-hospital cardiac arrest can extend the life of elderly patients, especially if ventricular fibrillation underlies the cardiac arrest' (23) . Researchers at the Medical College of Wisconsin in Milwaukee compared elderly and younger patients and concluded that 'even though elderly patients are more likely than younger patients to die during hospitalization, the hospital stay of the elderly is not longer, (they) do not have more residual neurologic impairments, and survival after hospital discharge is similar to that in younger patients' (21, 24 (3) ; to withhold it, in effect, would deny the patient any possibility for survival (25) .
In New York State, the law (26) is generally compatible with the halachic position. In the absence of a DNR order, New York State presumes that every patient admitted to a hospital consents to the administration of CPR in the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest. While an attending physician may issue a DNR order without the consent of a competent patient who 'would suffer immediate and severe injury from a discussion of cardiopulmonary resuscitation', he must first comply with a detailed protocol (27) . The attending physician can issue a DNR order if he determines (with the concurrence of another authorized physician) that: 'to a reasonable degree of medical certainty -"resuscitation would be medically futile"' (ie, CPR will be unsuccessful in restoring cardiac and respiratory function or the patient will experience repeated arrest in a short time period before death occurs.)
Halachically and ethically, may a doctor refrain from this potential life-saving action when he is reasonably certain that it is medically futile?
Underlying the ethical concern is the fundamental issue of whether CPR is regarded as an 'ordinary' or 'extraordinary' measure. There is no common law obligation to provide patients with extraordinary care and such treatment may be withheld (28 While the courts have respected the rights of individuals to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration, they would not compel nursing homes to honour such directives where the homes have notified the resident (and/or his family) of their policy to provide artificial nutrition and hydration at all times, (unless medically contra-indicated) upon admission. This position is based on a recent case which received much local media attention Elbaum v Grace Plaza (39). In Elbaum, the husband of a resident in Grace Plaza wished to enjoin the facility permanently from providing artificial nutrition and hydration to his wife. The Appellate Division, Second Department, overturned a lower court decision and ruled that the wife had made a firm and settled decision while competent to decline the treatment under her present circumstances; she had, in fact, extracted promises from her husband and family members not to prolong her life if she were in a persistent vegetative state. The court held that the group.bmj.com on June 21, 2017 -Published by http://jme.bmj.com/ Downloaded from wife's interests were not outweighed by those of Grace Plaza to preserve what it claimed to be the ethical integrity of the facility and the medical profession. The nursing home had failed to make its policy against the withdrawal of the gastrointestinal tube known to the family until after the family requested the removal of the tube. Thus, the family had every reason to believe that the wife's wishes would be honoured upon her admission to the home. The implications of this case are clear: where the nursing home provides notice of its treatment policies and ethical standards to the prospective resident (and/or family) upon admission, the interests of the home would supersede those of the entering resident. The resident would then have to consider another facility, or determine whether this nursing home would transfer him to another facility that would respect his wishes, in the event it became necessary to terminate his artificial feeding (39).
V: Ethical issues
The predominant legal view equating artificial nutrition (tube-feeding) with life-preserving medical treatment is shared by a wide range of physicians' groups and ethicists. They see no logical distinction between the removal of a respirator and the discontinuing of artificial nutrition. Just as a respirator may be required to maintain an oxygen flow to lungs which are not functioning, so tube-feeding may be necessary when the alimentary-digestive system is impaired due to disease, trauma, or bodily deterioration (40) . An apparent consequence of this view is that the patient's right to refuse medical treatment applies with equal force to the refusal of artificial nutrition and hydration. Yet, in practice, this is not always the case. In about half of the forty states which have living will statutes, nutrition is either excluded or circumscribed from the forms of lifeprolonging treatments which may be rejected (41 vegetable with no human qualities, why not terminate lifesustaining treatment to a terminal, severely-retarded patient who has been no more than a vegetable since birth? If, however, one subscribes to the 'sanctity of life' position, the line is clear: man cannot properly assess the value or relative quality of life. Advocates of this position propose that the very existence of the mentally and physically-retarded suggests that the value of human life is determined by God. 'Quality of life' is a subjective determination which often leads to the dangers of the slippery slope. 'Sanctity of life', however, is the unequivocal position that all human life is valuable and that life-sustaining efforts can only be suspended under clearly defined guidelines. As we indicated at the outset, the danger of the quality-of-life, slippery-slope rationale is particularly acute in our society, where critical-care beds are at a premium, and cost factors may unduly influence triage decisions (44).
VI: Tube-feeding in Halacha
The late internationally renowned halachic authority, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, in a series of responsa on medical issues, discusses the question of feeding a terminally ill patient intravenously. He maintains that providing proper nutrition is imperative, even in situations where intravenous feeding might only prolong a life of pain. The only exception to this rule would be where artificial nutrition would be medically contra-indicated. Rabbi Feinstein further declares that this procedure is so vital that it may be administered involuntarily. He distinguishes, however, between involuntary feeding, where the patient disagrees with the doctor's orders, but ultimately consents, and force-feeding, where he protests or must be physically restrained in order to be fed. In the latter, Rabbi Feinstein posits that the psychotrauma experienced by a dying patient whose wishes are thwarted might hasten his death. (See Baba bathra 147b) (45) .
A major Israeli authority, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, considers artificial nutrition to be routine, 'ordinary' treatment which may not be refused or withdrawn, as one might 'extraordinary' treatment. Consequently, a dying patient, suffering from metastatic cancer, must receive oxygen and the artificial nutrition and hydration which he requireseven if he is suffering and in great pain. Rabbi Auerbach compares these treatments to providing insulin, blood, transfusions and antibiotics, which may not be withdrawn, even in cases of terminal patients where withdrawal may be used to hasten their deaths (46) .
Rabbi Hershel Schachter, a leading scholar at Yeshiva University and Rabbi Chaskel Horowitz (the Viener Rav) maintain that artificial nutrition and hydration are medical procedures which a terminal patient may refuse.
Rabbi Schachter bases his ruling on the opinion of Rabbi Yaakov Emden in the Mor uketziyah on Schulchan aruch, Orach chaim 328 that the obligation to save lives is comparable to the obligation to restore lost articles (hashavat aveidah). Just as one who is in extreme discomfort is not required to return a lost article, so may a suffering, terminal patient refuse medical treatment to restore his lost health. Rabbi Schachter also finds difficulty with Rabbi Auerbach's contention that one must provide a dying patient who is suffering with nutrition and hydration against his will, while simultaneously praying for his demise to spare him any further suffering (11).
Rabbi Of course, patients may well be surprised if doctors suddenly start telling them that they have a right to insist on what they have always thought was theirs anyway (the right to privacy), but at least this would see off the department's new assault on confidentiality. But would it? Even if patients were to be so informed, doctors would also have to advise them that keeping information from some others, for example, those involved in any further or future health care, may well be against their interests. As a consequence patients would not know how to stipulate whom to exclude and whom to include: a blanket 'not to be released to managers' would doubtless not do the trick. The patient may well prefer to leave it all to the doctor, but as we have seen, the doctor cannot control what happens to personal health information.
Thus, informed consent in the form of advising the patient to refuse any release of information may not be the answer. The only other form which informed consent could take is to advise the patient that information will now only be 'confidential to the NHS'. Some patients will not care. Others faced by the implications of this, will decide not to confide certain matters to their doctors. They may not judge their doctors to be at fault but clearly trust will be an early casualty. So also will proper health care since the doctor will be treating the patient without knowing as much as the patient could tell him.
It is often a consequence of reforms of the NHS that good health care is the first casualty. The current assault on confidentiality (for managerial reasons) may be another example. Perhaps it is not too late for the booklet and the doubtful analysis underlying it to be abandoned. Or is confidentiality just not important enough?
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